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Abstract
This paper develops a model from an ex-post borrowers perspective and then tests it for
all main providers of Australian rural finance. The regression results reveal that the
hypothesised five-variables model is generally valid for the banking sector. The models
for Finance Companies and Other Government reduced to a two-variables model each,
while Total Sources reduced to a three-variables model. The five-variables model was
not confirmed for Insurance Companies and was not further analysed as this source has
declined to an insignificant level. The results of all models indicate that, irrespective of
the source of finance, the rural industry is highly risk-averse and has a preference for
equity finance rather than loans.
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1. Introduction
The rural industry has always occupied a unique place in Australia for at least two
reasons. Agricultural products, such as wool and wheat, comprised for a long period of
time the largest part of total Australian export. It is only recently that other
commodities, such as iron ore and subsequently manufactured products, have become
more significant in terms of Australian export, resulting in a decrease in the importance
ofrural export from 71% in 1965 to 29% in 1994.
The second reason relates to the rather volatile nature of the rural industry due to the
harsh climatic conditions in Australia, together with a price structure largely determined
by international market forces. It is not unusual for certain geographical regions to be
declared "relief deserving" by either State or Federal governments. To somewhat ease
the almost continuous financial problems of the rural industry, individual State
governments have set up special rural assistance authorities, which also administer the
Federal Government's Rural Adjustment Scheme. In other words, the rural sector had
always to live with the problem of financial difficulties, often originating from the fixed
interest rates commitments in times of depressed revenues due to either climatic
conditions or low commodity prices on world markets and rising costs. It was,
therefore, considered to be interesting to investigate the debt policy ofthe rural industry
from the borrowers perspective. This paper develops and tests a model of the demand
determinants of debt of the aggregate rural industry in Australia.
It is recognised that the area of risk, and attitude towards risk, for the Australian rural
industry is covered in the economic literature, eg Bond et al, (1980), Lewis et al,
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(1988), and Quiggin (1981), however, none of this literature focuses on risk in an
I
applied loan finance setting. The annual Farm Survey Reports (eg ABARE, 1995)
provide a wealth of financial and other information, including debt figures for the rural
industry in Australia, but do not provide any information on loan demand determinants.
This author is not aware of any empirical study which has focused on actual demand
determinants ofrural loan finance from a finance perspective.
Section two of this paper outlines the theoretical framework for the study by drawing
on the ex-antecredit-risk analysis literature of the banking industry from which relevant
ex-post demand variables are developed for inclusion in the model. Section three
identifies the risk characteristics of the rural industry and the main providers of rural
finance in Australia. Section four develops the hypotheses for the signs of the
independent variables and derives the model. Section five discusses the data collection
and the regression results of the model for the various providers of loan finance.
Section six provides a summary of the results, states the conclusions and
recommendations for further research.
2. The Theoretical Framework
It is generally accepted in the banking-finance literature (eg Sinkey, 1989, p 491) that
credit-risk analysis, ie the evaluation of the factors that may lead to a default in loan
service payments and/or final loan repayment, is a major determining factor in the final
loan decision by lending institutions such as banks. Only loan applications which are
believed not to fall into the "loan default risk" category progress to the actual loan
decision.
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Factors traditionally considered relevant III the credit-risk analysis literature are
capacity, character, capital, collateral, and conditions (Greenbaum et al, 1995;
Kidwell et aI, 1993; Reed et al, 1976; Rose et al, 1993). These factors are generally
discussed in the banking literature as ex-ante factors, ie factors which need to be taken
into consideration by lending institutions in making loan decisions.
"Capacity" refers to both, a borrowers' legal capacity (ie authority) to apply for the
loan, as well as the financial capacity to service and finally repay the debt. As this study
focuses on actual loans made, it is reasonable to assume that legal capacity for the debt
did exist when financial institutions provided finance. Legal capacity is thus irrelevant
for the purpose of this study.
The debt coverage ratio, or earnings available to pay interest (ie earnings before interest
and tax divided by interest, EBIT/I), is generally accepted in the literature to indicate
cash-flow capacity, ie the abilityto pay interest from normal operating cash-flows
"Character" refers to the borrowers' reputation for past timely payments and thus the
desire to service and repay future loan. Reputation is considered to increase with the
length of time of a serviced loan (Diamond 1991), resulting in a decrease of credit-risk.
The cost of defaulting is considered to be greater for a borrower with better reputation,
arising from a possible loss of lower interest rates due to positive reputation for prompt
payment. This means that the risk of defaulting is lower for a borrower with higher
reputation (Diamond, 1989).
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Due to the lack of publicly available information, it was not possible to include the
length oftime of a serviced loan as an explanatory variable in this study. Another proxy
could have been "age of business", ie the time of successful operation. However no
public information was available on this variable either.
"Capital" refers to the dollar amount available from owners equity, ie from internal
sources and, therefore, provides an alternative source of finance to debt. From an ex-
ante perspective, it is generally argued that high equity-funding will be considered
favourable in a lending decision as it signals the owners confidence in the business by
placing their own funds at risk. The debt/equity ratio, or leverage, is generally used in
the literature to express the relative level of equity funding.
Return-on-assets (ROA) is generally accepted as a measure of profitability on total
assets as it is a composite measure of the return on debt plus the return on equity.
From a lender's perspective a higher return-on-assets (ROA) is seen as a higher
increase in funds available to equity holders as debt holders do not participate in profits
above fixed interest payments, which will thus result in a larger increase in "Capital".
"Collateral" refers to the security provided by borrowers' underlying assets and a higher
collateral value is generally considered to provide a greater protection against credit-
risk. Secured debt collateral is a pledge against specific assets, with any excess ranking
as unsecured, while unsecured debt ranks before equity capital, which represents "last
resort security" for debt holders in case of default. Collateral thus represents lenders
security, secured and unsecured, in extreme cases of financial distress.
6
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"Collateral" was considered inappropriate as this study focuses on demand for finance
factors, rather than supply factors. Borrowers are concerned about ability to service
debt, in terms of payment of interest and principal. In an extreme situation where the
survival of the business depends on the borrowing of funds (eg the individual farm unit
requires funds for spring time sowing which cannot be met from internal sources) a loan
application will most likely be forthcoming irrespective of the existence of "collateral".
In this case the servicing of the loan is expected to come from funds received from the
harvest. The choice is thus between certain foreclosure (ie no sowing) and the
probability of continuity (ie earning of sufficient funds to service the loan). "Security to
the lender" in case of eventual payment default, and thus foreclosure, would in this case
not be a consideration to the borrower. "Collateral", ie the "security to the lender after
default", is thus a lending rather than a borrowing consideration. Although the
"collateral" level must meet minimum lending requirements in terms of market values
expressed debt/equity ratios, it is not important in the loan application itself
"Conditions" refers to macro-economic conditions which affect borrowers' loan
servicing and repayment abilities. Funds for loan servicing would normally come from
borrowers' operating income. Funds for loan repayments, on the other hand, would
come from one of three sources: accumulated earnings, sale of capital assets, and/or
new borrowing.
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3. Risk Characteristics and Sources of Finance of the Rural Sector
Based on the three size indicators of cash operating surplus, indebtedness and turnover,
shown in Table 1, a large proportion of the rural industry could be considered as small
business with family ownership rather than as widely held corporate ownership. It is,
therefore, reasonable to assume that financing decisions by the rural industry in
aggregate are made very much with an awareness of the personal risk of debt to the
borrower, which means that the rural industry in aggregate is risk-averse, will not be
overly influenced by the benefits of an optimal capital structure, and will only borrow if
it is considered absolutely necessary. It must, however, be recognised that the rural
industry frequently needs to borrow for short-term survival, eg in the case of
insufficient funds for essential spring sowing.
The assumption of conservative borrowing is supported by the relatively low
debt/equity and high interest cover ratios of the rural sector compared to other
industries in the economy, as indicated in Table 2. It is maintained that the relatively
low debt/equity ratio is due to the prudent borrowing practices of the rural industry
and, as the debt/equity ratio of the rural sector is not based on market valuation, is not
related to a risk evaluation by the market in the conventional way. Furthermore, the
relatively high interest cover ratio, compared to the average of other industries, also
indicates conservative borrowing practices by the rural industry. It is, however,
recognised that the debt/equity and interest cover ratios will, to some extent, also be
due to the lending policies and practices offinancial institutions.
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Table 1
Size Indicators of Australian Farm Businesses
Farm Businesses
% % %
1991 1992 1993
Cash Operating Surplus
$
<0 24 26 20
0-9,999 14 15 14
10,000 - 19,999 12 13 12
20,000 - 29,999 10 12 12
30,000 - 39,999 10 7 9
40,000 - 49,999 6 6 6
50,000 - 99,999 16 14 16
100,000 and over 8 7 11
Indebtedness
$
0 28 25 25
1 - 4,999 6 5 6
5,000 - 9,999 4 4 3
I
9 810,000 - 24,999 9
25,000 - 49,999 10 10 9
50,000 - 99,999 11 13 13
100,000 - 199,999 14 16 14
100,000 - 199,999 18 19 21
Turnover
$
< 50,000 25 24 22
50,000 - 99,999 24 27 24
100,000 - 149,999 18 17 17
150,000 - 199,999 10 10 10
200,999 - 249,999 7 6 8
250,000 - 299,999 4 5 5
300,000 and over 12 11 14
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Table 2
Debt/Equity and Interest Cover of Australian Industries
DebUEquity ratio Interest Cover
Industry 1993 1991 1988 1993 1991 1988
% % % times times times
Oil and Gas 95.99 73.11 111.08 2.39 2.03 2.04
Diversified Resources 88.62 86.26 126.61 3.55 3.20 4.01
Developers and 66.31 54.97 55.14 2.97 2.42 2.93
Contractors
Building Materials 60.79 68.35 61.95 3.61 3.10 4.19
Alcohol and Tobacco 117.33 107.91 62.46 2.25 2.13 2.30
Food and Household 99.57 77.94 78.20 3.35 2.18 2.45
Chemicals 30.28 37.33 44.31 5.15 2.70 7.78
Engineering 67.78 63.44 34.91 2.83 1.99 3.48
Paper and Packaging 116.66 129.12 137.39 1.85 1.90 2.59
Retail 178.67 105.00 70.05 1.92 -0.40 3.21
Transport 112.86 138.87 123.68 2.57 1.82 4.22
Media 92.56 154.66 207.96 2.43 0.80 1.86
Rural (1) 17.22 16.18 13.03 3.89 1.89 5.13
Source: ASX, various issues
(1) ABS: 7507.0; 75.005
Based on Reserve Bank information (RBA, 1994), the main providers of rural finance
can be separated into four main lender categories: Banks, Pastoral and Other Finance
Companies, Other Government, and Life Insurance Companies. Other Government
includes advances made under the "War Service Land Settlement Act", the
"Agricultural Re-establishmentAct" and those made from State funds.
Banks have traditionally always been the main providers of rural finance and their
relative importance has increased from 50.8% in 1965 to 81.0% in 1994. The relative
importance of the other three providers has declined over the same period, with the
traditionally least important one, ie Life Insurance Companies, falling from 5.0% in
1965 to 0.4% in 1994, (see Table 3).
The actual lending decisions ofall four rural loan provider categories will be used as the
dependent variables in this study.
10
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Table 3
Percentages held of Rural Debt
YEAR BankslTotal FinColTotal GovtlTotal LifelnslTotal
30 Jun
% % % %
1965 50.8527 20.0775 24.0310 5.0388
1970 56.3881 16.7627 20.7012 6.1479
1975 59.3380 11.4017 25.0102 4.2501
1980 64.0488 8.6230 25.5505 1.7777
1985 73.3389 8.3892 17.1692 1.1027
1990 70.8143 12.6674 15.8862 0.6404
1994 81.0427 7.0844 11.5283 0.3508
4. Hypotheses and Model Development
In order to develop a model of aggregate ex-post lending decisions, the focus of the
independent variables was changed from the ex-ante focus of the banking/finance
literature of credit-risk analysis to an ex-post focus. Ex-post situations also need to
incorporate borrowers requests for loans and not only lenders decision criteria, ie
willingness to make loans. Although it is recognised that actual loans are
supply/demand equilibrium situations, actual lending to the rural industry will not occur
without rural industry demand in the first place. Changes in the aggregate demand for
loans will inevitable lead to changes in aggregate loans made. From the lender's
perspective the demand of the rural industry is considered within an overall
lending/investment portfolio, thus acting as a moderating, rather than as an initiating,
force in aggregate lending. To develop the model for the purpose of this study, the
independent variables had to be modified for borrowers attitude and behaviour towards
risk.
Gross Farm Product (GFP) and Rural Export (EXP) are used as proxies for prevailing
macro-economic conditions. Although it is recognised that both variables are to some
extent related phenomena, they nevertheless measure different phenomena. Gross Farm
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Product (GFP) which measures the rural component of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
represents approximately 2.7% ofGDP for the period 1991/2 to 1993/4. In addition to
indicating revenue figures for the rural sector, GFP is a measure which also includes
allowances for subsidies, production costs, and indirect taxes. It must also be pointed
out that GFP covers revenue of the total rural industry, ie domestic plus export. On
the other hand, rural export (EXP) is a strictly "revenue only" measure from one source
only, ie export. Rural export is an important part of Australian overall export
(approximately 28.5% for the period 1991/2 to 1993/4), which is, however, heavily
weighted towards individual rural sectors, eg meat, wool, and wheat.
It is maintained that it would be easier to borrow in times of higher levels of Gross
Farm Product (GFP) and Export (EXP) since applications for loans would look
relatively healthier, resulting in higher debt levels, which leads to the following two
hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: The rural loan amount is positively correlated with the level of Gross
Farm Product (GFP).
Hypothesis 2: The rural loan amount is positively correlated with the level of Rural
Export (EXP).
This study uses the Equity/Assets (E/A) ratio (which is a variation of the debt/equity
ratio) as a proxy for "Capital", indicating the owners' relative financial interest in the
business. In ex-postsituations, a change in the (E/A) ratio thus indicates the change of
12
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relative significance of equity (compared to debt) as a source of funds used for
investments which the borrower considered essential/desirable and the lender
considered acceptable. The past debt/equity ratios of the rural sector (which are the
lowest for any industry, see Table 2), was thus a joint assessment of the rural and
financial sectors to be at an appropriate/acceptable level.
The incentive for borrowing/leverage, within acceptable risk limits, is generally
described in the finarice literature in terms of the benefits derived from higher returns to
borrowers as a loan provider's share of profits is limited by the stated interest rate. Two
basic assumptions in this line of reasoning are that the returns on borrowed funds
exceeds the cost of these funds, ie funds are borrowed to increase returns, and that the
borrower has a choice between these two sources, ie internal funds are available if so
desired. Although this reasoning will to some extent also be true in the case of the rural
industry, it nevertheless overlooks the frequent need by the rural industry to borrow in
order to survive. Depressed product prices and constant/increasing costs, together with
adverse climatic conditions make "survival borrowing" by the rural industry often more
important than borrowing for the purpose of an increase in returns. The extent to
which the rural industry will borrow will, therefore, often be subject to a trade-off
between a risk-averse attitude and the extent of the determination to survive.
Accepting the risk-averse nature of the rural industry, it is expected that the rural
industry will use equity, rather than debt, as a source of finance whenever possible.
Equity finance will also be used to reduce debt levels whenever possible. Debt finance
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on the other hand will be used only if insufficient equity finance is available and the
investment is considered either essential or critical for short-term survival.
The fundamental risk-averse nature of the industry together with the high volatility of
the availability of internal funds, and thus the need for debt finance, will require a
frequent readjustment of the E/A ratio, which will, however, be maintained by the
surviving farm units within its established range in the longer term. A relatively static
E/A ratio is not expected as it would indicate the availability of internal funds whenever
required and "survival borrowing" would largely not exist, a situation which is contrary
to the nature of the industry. This reasoning leads to hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 3: The rural loan amount is negatively correlated with the Equity/Assets
(E/A) ratio.
Return-on-Assets (ROA) is used as a second proxy for "Capital" which indicates return
to both, equity and debt. As the lender does not share in any profits above stated
interest rates, any i~crease in profitability will, therefore, result in a larger inflow to
equity with some of it being retained, and vice versa. An increased equity, in the form
of retained earnings, means that less debt finance will be needed for investments. It is,
therefore, expected that a higher ROA will lead to a lower demand for debt finance and,
despite a greater willingness by lenders to provide loans, to a lower level of debt, which
leads to hypothesis 4.
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Hypothesis 4: The rural loan amount is negatively correlated with return-on assets
(ROA~.
The debt coverage ratio, ie earnings available to pay interest (earnings before interest
and tax divided by interest, or EBIT/I) is used in this study as a proxy for "Capacity".
The ability to pay interest as it falls due is an important risk consideration not only for
lenders but also for borrowers. Rural borrowers, being risk-averse, will apply for loans
if they believe that they will have the ability to service the loans. The fact that
investment loans, as distinct from working capital loans, are generally long term
arrangements, a sufficiently high margin of safety of current earnings available to cover
required interest payment will provide borrowers with the confidence to apply for loans
and lenders with the confidence to provide the loans.
Based on this reasoning, it is expected that a higher EBITII ratio will result in a higher
level of borrowers' confidence and higher lenders' willingness to lend, which in turn
will result in a higher level of debt.
Hypothesis 5: The rural loan amount is positively correlated with the earnings-before-
interest-and-tax to interest (EBITII) ratio.
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The following model has been developed to test the above five hypotheses:
In Y, t = a, + ai In (GFP)t + a2 In (EXP)t - a3 In (E/A)t + Cl4 In (EBIT/I)t
- as In (ROA)t + et
where:
Xi = GFPt = Gross Farm Product in period t
X2 = EXPt = Rural Export in period t
X3= E/At= Equity to Assets ratio of the rural sector in period t
X4 = EBIT/It = Times Interest Earned by the rural sector in period t
Xs = ROAt =Return on Assets of the rural sector in period t
et = error term in period 1.
Although this model was developed on the basis of the banking-finance literature (ie the
literature on depository institutions such as banks), it was considered appropriate to test
it for each of the main providers of rural finance Y, t (as dependent variables), as
reported by the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA, 1994), where Yit represents:
Y1= Loans by Banks in period t (Banks)
Y2=Loans by Finance Companies in period t (FinCo)
Y3 = Loans by Other Government in period t (Govt)
Y4 = Loans by Life Insurance Companies in period t (LifeIns)
Y, = Loans by Total of all Sources (ie the sum ofY, to Y4) in period t (Total).
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5. Data Sources and Regression Results
Data for the independent variables of this study was taken from various issues of the
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) publications, which are indicated in the relevant
places. However, the three major sources were: (1) ABS 5206.0 (National Income and
Expenditure Accounts) for GFP, (2) ABS 5303.0 (Balance of Payments) for EXP, and
(3) ABS 7507.0 (Agricultural Industries, Financial Statistics) for the figures required to
calculate the ratios ofE/A, EBIT/I, and ROA.
Data from ABS 7507.0 were unfortunately not available for the total period of Rural
Debt statistics (1965 to 1994) given in Reserve Bank Bulletin, December 1994. As it
was not possible to construct proxies for these statistics for the missing years, analysis
had to be limited to the 16 annual periods for which such data is available.
Data for the dependent variables, Rural Debt, were taken from the December, 1994
Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin (RBA, 1994), which uses information provided by
the lending institutions to the Reserve Bank. The data were available on an annual
basis (as at 30 June) for the period 1965 to 1994 and separated into four main lender
categories: All Banks (Banks), Pastoral and Other Finance Companies (FinCo), Other
Government (Govt) and Life Insurance Companies (LifeIns).
The summary results of the analysis for the five-variables regression model for each of
the providers of rural loans (Banks, Finance Companies, Other Government, Life
Insurance Companies, and Total ofall Sources) are shown in the Appendix.
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5.1. Banks
The regression results for Banks were as follows:
Loans by Banks = 35.4764 + 0.7894 In GFP + 0.5553 In EXP - 8.5998 InEtA
(t-values) (5.82) (3.05)** (2.55)** (-6.11)*
+ 0.3692 InEBITII - 0.7076 In ROA.
(t-values) (2.55)** (-3.49)*
R2 = 99.2, R2adj. = 98.8, F statistic = 248.19*
Levels of significance: * = 1%, ** = 5%.
The results show that all five variables carry the correct signs which suggests
acceptance of the above mentioned hypotheses in the case of banks. The results also
indicate that the independent variable EtA has the highest elasticity with -8.6% and thus
the highest explanatory power in the model. EBITII, has the lowest elasticity (0.4%).
A test for first order autocorrelation (ie Ho: p = 0), using the Durbin-Watson statistic,
suggests that the null hypothesis (Ho: p = 0) should not be rejected at the 1% level, ie
there are no serious problems with serial correlation.
5.2. Finance Companies
I
The data in the Appendix, suggests that the variables EXP, EBITII and ROA do not
carry the correct sign in the case of finance companies. A stepwise deletion of these
variables resulted in the following regression model:
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Loans by FinCo = 43.7927 + 1.1449 In GFP - 10.5981 In EfA.
(t-values) (4.26) (12.39)* (-4.70)*
R2 = 94.0, R2 adj = 93.1, F-value of 102.370*
Levels of significance: * = 1%.
Unlike the situation with Banks, Gross Farm Product (GFP), rather than EfA, has the
larger explanatory power of the two variables in the model, with an elasticity of
12.39%.
The Durbin-Watson autocorrelation test, using the Maximum-Likelihood technique,
revealed a statistical value of 1.527 which indicates no significant autocorrelation at the
1% level.
5.3. Other Government
The results in the Appendix indicate that the variables EBITII and ROA do not carry
the correct sign and the variable GFP is not significant. A sequential deletion of these
variables from the original five-variables model resulted in the following equation:
Loans by Govt = 14.7343 + 0.7106 In EXP - 3.1603 In EfA.
(t-values) (3.61) (22.20)* (-3.53)*
R2 = 97.7, R2 adj = 97.4, F-statistic = 280.775*.
Levels of significance: * = 1%.
Export (EXP) has a higher elasticity (22.20%) than the Equity/Assets ratio and thus the
higher explanatory power of the two variables in the model.
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The autocorrelation test shows a Durbin-Watson d'" value of 1.705, which falls into the
"no autocorrelation" region at the 5% level.
5.4. Life Insurance Companies
As can be seen from the data in the Appendix the results indicate that none of five
independent variables carry the correct sign. As Life Insurance Companies have
reduced to the level of being an insignificant provider of rural finance, (0.35% of total
rural finance in 1994 as shown in Table 3), the results for this sector were no further
analysed.
5.5. Total of all Sources
The data in the Appendix indicates that all independent variables carried the correct
signs but EBIT/I was insignificant. The deletion of this variable also required the
deletion ofROA due to insignificance. The remaining three-variables model with GFP,
EXP and EIA resulted in the following model:
Loans by all Sources = 26.1508 + 0.4488 In GFP + 0.6405 In EXP - 6.0850 In E/A
(t-values) (5.71) (2.10)** (3.42)* (-6.04)*
R2 98.8, R2adj = 98.5, F statistic = 322.272*
Levels of significance: * = 1%, ** = 5%.
Due the dominance of banks as a source of rural loan finance, it is not surprising that,
similar to the results of bank loans, the EquitylAssets (EIA) ratio has the highest
elasticity, and thus explanatory power in the model.
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The Durbin-Watson test indicates no serious autocorrelation for the model (l = 1.443)
at the 1% level.
6. Summary
The sign hypotheses of the five-variables model was confirmed only for rural loan
finance supplied by banks. The Equity/Assets ratio provides the greatest explanatory
power for bank loan finance, indicating the fundamental risk-averse nature of the
industry with a relative preference for the use of equity finance over debt finance. The
high volatility of the availability of internal funds and the need for "survival borrowing"
makes a frequent readjustment of the Equity/Assets ratio necessary to reduce increased
debt levels whenever internal funds make it possible.
The five-variables model was not confirmed for loans by Finance Companies due to the
incorrect signs of the variables EXP, EBIT/I and ROA. Correct signs were obtained
after the model was reduced to two variables, Gross Farm Product (GFP) and
Equity/Assets (E/A). Contrary to the results of the bank loan model, GFP, rather than
E/A, was the variable with the relatively greater explanatory power. This result
indicates that, in the case of finance companies, the demand for rural loans is
predominantly based on the level ofGross Farm Product.
The test of the model for loans from Other Government sources indicated similar
results to those for finance companies. The test of the five-variables model indicated
the wrong signs for the variables EBITII and ROA and insignificant results for GFP
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(81% level) and E/A (17% level). The subsequent contraction of the model resulted a
two-variables model, consisting of Export and Equity/Assets. Of these two variables,
Export had the greater explanatory power indicating its relative importance in the
demand for Other Government rural finance.
The test of the five-variables model for life insurance companies indicated a wrong sign
for all five variables. As life insurance companies have become an insignificant source
of rural loans (0.35% in 1994) the results were not analysed any further.
Due to the insignificance of the variables EBIT/I and ROA, the model for loan finance
from All Sources reduced to three variables, Gross Farm Product, Export and
Equity/Assets. As banks are the main providers of rural loan finance (81% in 1994) it
was not surprising that, similarto the results from banks, Equity/Assets was the variable
with the highest explanatory power.
All loan determinants models identified in this study did show a high degree of
correlation, based on R2 calculations, and a 1% level of significance, based on F-
statistics. Furthermore, as measured by the Durbin-Watson statistic, none of the
models suffered from an interpretation complication due to serial correlation (at least at
the 5% level).
A possible interpretation of the poor regression results of the five-variables model for
providers of finance other than banks (ie finance companies and other government)
(which is a possible area for further research) suggests that banks are the main financial
22
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institution for the rural industry not only as providers of loan finance, but also in terms
of providing the most comprehensive range of services to the industry. Under these
circumstances the rural industry would only tum to alternative institutions if it was
refused by banks, or if other institutions provided specialised services, for example
provide loans on special terms. For example, the rural industry may tum to finance
companies (which do include pastoral companies) as a second choice if it needs funds
which are not provided by banks. This argument is supported by the greater
explanatory power of Gross Farm Product in the identified model offinance companies,
as well as the declining importance of finance companies, and the increasing importance
of banks, as a source of rural finance. Loan applications to finance companies will,
however, only be forthcoming in conjunction with a shortfall of internal sources.
A similar reasoning can be applied for Other Government as a supplier of rural loan
finance. Furthermore, this sector does also include special rural finance arrangements
under the War Service Land Settlement and Agricultural Re-establishment Acts.
Applicants, applying under the special arrangements of these Acts, do not fall into the
normal characteristics of the conventional rural industry and thus represent a different
"clientele group".
Life insurance companies are different in that they are not depository institutions or
financial intermediaries, and thus are not lenders in the same sense as the other suppliers
of finance covered in this study and would attract different applicants.
23
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Based on the results of this study several other avenues open up for further
investigation. For example, this study can be extended by focusing on lenders
assessment processes to identify the determinants of individual actual loan applications
and thus identify and quantify the extent to which lenders credit-risk analyses have the
moderating influence on the loan demand referred to in this paper.
Demand determinants could be investigated on the basis of individual applications to
lenders. This would require investigating actual loan applications, received by lenders,
in terms ofthe underlying determinants identified in this study. Through this method of
triangulation the results of this study could be corroborated.
A third area of research could be to identify rural borrowers attitude towards risk and
its effect on the decision criteria for placing a loan application.
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Appendix
Regression Results of Five-Variables Model
LnX1 LnX2 LnX3 LnX4 LnX5
Constant LnGFP LnEXP LnElA LnEBIT/1 LnROA
Source of Debt So a, a2 a3 a4 as R2 R2(adj) F
LnBanks (Coef) 35.4764 0.7894 0.5553 -8.5998 0.3692 -0.7076 99.2 98.8 248.19
(t) 5.82 3.05 2.55 -6.11 2.55 -3.49
(p-value) 0.0002 0.0122 0.0287 0.0001 0.0288 0.0059 0.0001
LnFinCO (Coef) 35.7074 1.8829 -0.7501 -8.7927 -0.3473 0.4562 96.9 95.4 63.35
(t) 3.20 3.97 -1.88 -3.41 -1.31 1.23
(p-value) 0.0095 0.0026 0.0891 0.0067 0.2194 0.2478 0.0001
LnGovt (Coef) 8.4325 0.0482 0.5855 -1.5638 -0.2568 0.1519 98.8 98.2 161.21
(t) 1.86 0.25 3.62 -1.49 -2.38 1.01
(p-value) 0.0929 0.8075 0.0047 0.1666 0.0384 0.3384 (0.0001)
LnLifelns (Coef) -9.1922 -0.2251 -0.2026 3.6048 -0.3167 0.9176 90.9 86.4 20.02
(t) -1.21 -0.70 -0.75 2.05 -1.75 3.63
(p-value) 0.2546 0.5012 0.4722 0.0671 0.1098 0.0046 (0.0001)
LnTolal (Coef) 32.7005 0.7483 0.4084 -7.5634 0.2008 -0.4297 99.2 98.9 246.56
(t) 6.29 3.39 2.20 -6.30 1.63 -2.48
(p-value) o.ooo: 0.0069 0.0523 0.0001 0.1348 0.0324 (0.0001)
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